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Abstract
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by Nancy MacLean (Viking, 2017), The Long Depression by Michael Roberts (Haymarket Books, 2016),
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Transnational corporations have accumulated what several observers have called a
“hegemonic” position of power within capitalist states and within the structures of the global
marketplace. An expansion of corporate power has occurred within a global capitalist system
beset by profit crises and corporate reorganization. Corporations have restructured their global
operations in response to falling rates of profit endemic to capitalism. At the same time,
corporations have increasingly attempted to leverage their market power and their political
power to compensate for declining rates of profit. That means ongoing efforts to privatize public
services, to reduce regulation of corporate activities and to expand the opportunities for global
accumulation through expansion of global supply chains. To fully understand the relationship
between corporations, the market and the state, we need a holistic analysis that examines the
structural crisis of contemporary capitalism as a starting point. Transnational corporations exist
within a competitive logic of global capitalism whose very features create recurring crises of
profitability. What Marx described as a “tendency of the rate of profit to fall” is the subject of
Michael Roberts book, The Long Depression, which provides a structural framework for
understanding the contemporary capitalist world economy.
Roberts in his first substantive chapter outlines and defends his classical Marxist theory
against alternative Marxist, Keynesian and classical liberal (and neoliberal) frameworks. The
central aspect of his approach is the theory adopted by Marx in Capital, especially a close
reading of volumes 2 and 3, which develops the relationship between the organic and variable
composition of capital that is used to explain the tendency of the rate of profit to fall in a
capitalist economy. In short, Roberts argues that every crisis in capitalism from the late 19th
Century to the present can be explained by a falling profit rate that precedes and generates the
crisis. He examines data to illustrate a relationship between the organic and variable
composition of capital and the tendency of the rate of profit to fall, following a trajectory
established by Marx long ago, but subject to considerable dispute among a wide range of
contemporary economists, both Keynesian, Marxian and mainstream. Roberts asserts that there
is compelling evidence across diverse time periods in capitalist history that profit crises are
caused by an inevitable increase in the ratio of the organic composition of capital (fixed costs of
capital investment that includes technology, machinery, operating equipment, tools of
production) relative to the variable composition of capital (labor).
There are several underlying assumptions of the theory that are essential to the argument.
The first is that capitalist profits are dependent on the extraction of surplus value from labor
exploitation, which is defined as “variable costs” to the extent that labor exploitation is
dependent on getting workers to produce well beyond what they are being paid in wages. The
ability of capitalists to increase the rate of exploitation is central to maintaining a profit rate that
acts as an incentive to increase capital investment. Capitalists compete against each other in an
attempt to maximize their profit rates, which involves efforts to expand market share (relative to
other capitalists), increase the productivity of their workers through raising the gap between
productivity and wages, and introduce capital-intensive technology (organic composition of
capital) in an attempt to increase the production of a finished product. The problem arises,
according to theorists of the organic composition of capital theory espoused by Roberts, as
capitalists increase their reliance on the organic composition of capital relative to the variable
composition. This means that fixed capital costs associated with technology, machinery, tools of
production, rise against the costs associated with variable capital (labor), which is the basis of the
extraction of surplus value. As more capitalists attempt to increase the utilization of labor-saving

machinery into the production process, the ability to extract surplus value diminishes, thereby
generating a tendency for the rate of profit to fall.
The strength of Roberts analysis is his use of statistical correlation to demonstrate a
plausible relationship between the increase in the organic composition of capital and the
declining rate of profit that precedes major capitalist crises, including the capitalist depressions
of the late 19th Century, the Great Depression of the 1930s, the global recession of 1979-1982,
and the contemporary “long depression” associated with the capitalist crisis from 2008 to the
present, where Roberts spends the majority of his analysis. What is striking about each of these
time periods in global capitalist history is their association with major changes in the structure of
capitalist production, from the introduction of iron, steel, chemicals, shipbuilding and railroad
technologies at the turn of the 19th century to the shift toward assembly line production that
characterized the move toward mass production of motor vehicles, machine tools, consumer
appliances and armaments that accompanied the period of the 1920s, 1930s and 1940s.
Meanwhile the period of the 1970s to the present has seen the growth and application of
information computer technology that has facilitated the creation of globalized capitalist
production, supply and value networks that have upended previous capitalist production
structures. The incorporation of both new technologies and new production methods are
compatible with Roberts identification of profitability crises, or lengthy periods of capitalist
history where investment in the “organic composition of capital” increases substantially relative
to the variable or labor composition of capital, thereby creating a falling rate of profit. For
Roberts, these periods are endemic to capitalism as a system.
Critics of Roberts, on both the Marxian and Keynesian front, say that he has a conceptual
difficulty demonstrating the separation between organic and variable capital investment. In other
words, why does only labor generate surplus value at the point of production? Doesn’t the
creation of new technological innovations raise productivity beyond the extraction of surplus
value in production? What about the complexity of separating technological innovation from the
exploitation of labor? In a day and age where profits are closely associated with intellectual
property rights held by a corporation, the ability of the organic composition of capital theory to
disentangle “dead labor” from “living labor” might strike many observers as problematic.
Namely because the introduction of technology into the production process is preceded by a
series of steps undertaken by corporations to socialize the cost of acquiring new technology to
the public, and to privatize the profits on which this technology is acquired. In other words, the
very acquisition of intellectual property rights by a corporation involves acquiring a quasimonopoly right to a technological innovation. The fact that the innovation often occurs through
a range of intellectual and physical labor that is party subsidized by the public through research
institutions, tax credits, infrastructure and education, complicates efforts to distinguish so-called
“dead labor” from “living labor.” The capture of surplus value by workers to capitalists goes
through a series of mediated steps that are governed by the rules of particular markets that
involve class struggle as mediated by states. Where labor is stronger, and public institutions are
more robust, the process of public innovation is not captured by capitalists to the same degree.
In other words, while I believe that Roberts has captured a central structural dynamic of the
tendency of profits to fall over a long timeframe, his framework is less effective in capturing the
ebbs and flows of profit rates within each structural cycle.
Despite this shortcoming, there is overarching power in Roberts’ formulation. Structural
factors appear to explain, over the long term, the increasing convergence of a wide range of
nation-states toward similar long-term trends. For example, nation-states that have divergent

histories, diverse institutional cultures, distinct socioeconomic characteristics and different
“production profiles” (i.e. the type of goods being produced), have all been experiencing, to
varying degrees, declining rates of profits across all the periods that Roberts has theorized.
Second, the declining rates of profit identified by Roberts do correspond to measurements he
(and others) have used to trace an increased composition of organic capital relative to variable
capital. Third, the falling rates of profit precede crisis tendencies in capitalism that capitalist
firms then attempt to address through a variety of compensatory mechanisms. These
mechanisms include the following: globalizing production across nation-states to reduce labor
and regulatory costs of capitalist production (a tendency that began during the latter stages of the
long decline in profit rates experienced by the Fortune 500 capitalist firms from 1965-1982);
replacing investments in capital with a greater percentage of investments in financial services
and speculation (a financialization of capitalist profits that began as a response to the falling rate
of profit at the end of the 1965-1982 period, and accelerated with the most recent period of the
falling rate of profit from 1998 to the present); and finally a lobbying assault that has eroded
public spending on social welfare, labor and business regulations across a range of capitalist
states, a process that is associated with the origins of neoliberal capitalism (1980s to the present)
but has increased substantially with the most recent crises in capitalist profitability from 1998 to
the present.
Roberts’ structural explanations for recurring capitalist crises proves useful in
anticipating maneuvers by capitalist firms to restructure their operations in response to crises
periods, defined by Roberts as crises of profitability generated by the increased ratio of organic
to variable capital composition. But is Roberts’ theory of the cause of the profit crises essential
to make sense of it? Or is his theory a broad-brushed explanation that underplays the importance
of the crisis of consumption (the Keynesian approach which is also shared by a strand of Marxist
theorists associated with the Rosa Luxembourg school)? Or does his theory underplay the
central importance of the financialization of capital as a causal factor in capitalist crises? How
an argument is sequenced is of crucial importance in determining plausible causation, because
the best that Roberts, or any economic historian can do, is to provide evidence of strong
correlation that lends credence to their particular theory. I believe that Roberts has accomplished
this, but to fully explain the crises of contemporary capitalism, we need more than structural
approaches, we need an application of structural factors with instrumental factors. With that in
mind, the work of Jerry Harris is of central importance. Harris’ latest book, Global Capitalism
and the Crisis of Democracy, is the latest publication among many that documents the growth of
what Harris, and most notably Leslie Sklair1 and William Robinson, among others, has identified
as the Transnational Capitalist Class (TCC).
The transnational capitalist class emerges from what theorists associate with a crisis of
global capitalism in the 1970s. That crisis, analyzed by early adherents of the Gramscian school
of international political economy, notably the work of Robert Cox,2 was generated by a failure
of the previous system of capitalist production to overcome the limitations of a production
structure that was concentrated around the nation-state. This system, often labeled Bretton
Woods, attempted to limit the flows of financial capital across borders by allowing nation-states
to implement capital controls. These controls, according to the pioneering work of Eric
Helleiner, were supported by dominant transnational firms until the late 1960s, when leading
transnational capitalist groups, including the U.S. based-Committee on Economic Development,
began advocating for a relaxation if not elimination of capital controls. Corporations that at one
time benefitted from the Bretton Woods system, were for the first time advocating for an easing

of restrictions that would decrease the costs of global investment strategies. It is no coincidence
that transnational corporations began advocating for an easing of investment restrictions after
facing a crisis of profitability that began in 1965. Transnational firms sought to cooperate with
each other by working across nation-states as part of a political project that saw greater capitalist
integration as part of the solution to capitalism’s profitability crisis. The formation of the
Trilateral Commission in 1973, documented in the work of Stephen Gill,3 was one of the first
expressions of the political agency of transnational capital, which sought to mediate a global
accumulation crisis reflected in the impact of the rising price of global oil and the ensuing
stagflation of the Bretton Woods period. The role of the Trilateral Commission came alongside
the growth of other transnational capitalist organizations, including the Business Roundtable of
the U.S., formed in 1972, and the later emergence of the European Roundtable of Industrialists,
formed in 1983. The expression of transnational capitalist interests in Japan was embodied by
the emergence of Keidanren. At the same time, transnational capitalist interests were
increasingly expressed by firms in the International Chambers of Commerce. This process of
transnational accumulation was accelerated by the extent to which previously closed economies
in China and Russia emerged as state conduits for the growth of transnational capitalist class
interests.
There have been erroneous critiques of the transnational capitalist class theory that Jerry
Harris discusses in his most recent book. William Robinson had already produced an extensive
response to his critics in his book, Global Capitalism and the Crisis of Humanity. Contrary to
what some critics have charged, the TCC does not represent a negation of the nation-state, or the
elimination of conflict with other sectors of capital and popular social movements and/or
governments that may emerge to challenge the prerogatives of transnational capital. Instead, the
emergence of powerful fractions of the TCC has occurred within an uneven, contested and
ongoing negotiation between the TCC, nation-state bureaucracies and other fractions of capital
and, at times, oppositional social movements based in civil society. What Harris and Robinson
have argued, though, is that the TCC has emerged as politically hegemonic within nation-states
and within supra-national institutions that have become increasingly powerful in establishing the
norms for global governance. The ability of TCC actors to leverage their political and economic
power is both due to the changing structure of global capitalism as well as the active agency of
the TCC itself. Transnational capital is integrated by a global structure of production and
accumulation that has been determined by the ascendancy of TCC power within the marketplace
and within the nation-state. Transnational investors led by financial interests have integrated
global markets and production structures to produce webs of interconnected profit-making
investors that I have labeled transnational interest blocs. My debt to the TCC theory has been
well-documented in my previous work, but the difference is that I see the emergence of a truly
integrated TCC as incomplete. Instead I describe “transnational fractions” of corporate interest
blocs whose orientation to profits is constrained, predicted, and guided by longstanding
relationships with particular nation-states and within regional networks of accumulation. In my
formulation, transnational firms have not lost their ties to nation-states entirely, but have used
their longstanding relationship with powerful states (their “home base”) to transition toward
transnational accumulation strategies that involve competition with other transnational firms,
which I describe as “transnational interest bloc” competition. I share with TCC theorists the
understanding that the ties between transnational interest blocs and nation-states have been fluid
and shifting, so that, as with the concept of TCC, transnational interest blocs are quite willing to
shift their locus of activity from one state to another, depending on a calculation of which

relationship gives the interest bloc the greatest avenue for profit-making. The difference
between my own formulation and the TCC theory is one of subtle degree: I emphasize less a
globally integrated TCC, indeed I reject the utility of the concept, in favor of a looser conception
that I call “transnational interest bloc,” to highlight my analytic preference for the extent to
which interest bloc actors are more competitive, conflicted and less organized than the TCC
theorists would allow for.4
That being said, I am in complete agreement with the Robinson and Harris formulations
regarding the following propositions, outlined in their recent books. First, the rise of
transnational capitalist hegemony within the governance of nation-states has generated a “crisis
of democracy.” That is, civil society interests within nation-states have steadily lost ground to
powerful transnational corporations which utilize nation-states to further transnational profits
tied to global accumulation strategies. Political party labels have lost all meaning as both selfdescribed “socialist” and “conservative” parties have adopted the policies most favored by
sectors of transnational capital. This has created a deepening crisis of legitimacy for Western
capitalist states in particular, whose nation-states are most directly implicated in working to
facilitate the conditions for profitable accumulation by transnational capital. The use of
neoliberalism as an ideology to promote transnational capitalist accumulation strategies has
accelerated the legitimacy crisis. The governments of nation-states in the U.S. and Western
Europe are, in most cases, experiencing a steady decline in popular support, exemplified by the
rise of far right parties that have often successfully challenged established orthodoxies and
institutions. The relationship between these far right parties and neoliberalism has often been
misunderstood, however, as Robinson and Harris make clear in their analyses. Neoliberal
capitalists have sought to delegitimize the state to reduce regulatory and taxation barriers that
interfere with further capitalist accumulation. That has redirected more of the state’s functions
toward corporate welfare, and less toward social welfare for the working class and poor. The
result has been a backlash led by ultra-rightist or neo-fascist groups that cannot be easily
controlled or managed by transnational capitalist groups. These groups redirect the blame for the
contemporary capitalist crises away from corporations and toward the most vulnerable groups in
society: minority groups and immigrants in particular. In this regard, the far right is less
threatening to transnational capital than left-wing movements would be. Indeed, neo-fascist
movements are often complementary to transnational capitalist profits in helping to prop up a
military-industrial-prison-intelligence complex that can then police the growing underclass with
the use of force.
Furthermore, as Harris and Robinson have argued, the emergence of the far right is
directly connected to the policies that have been promoted by transnational capitalists over the
past 40 years: privatization of public services; austerity measures that have provided tax cuts and
subsidies to the rich and to corporations while gutting public services for the working class and
poor; investment agreements that enhance the power and privileges of corporations across state
borders; attacks on unions spearheaded by transnational capitalist organizations; and the
weakening of democratic institutions in favor of unaccountable corporate decision-making
structures, evident in both the U.S. and the European Union. These policies have contributed to
a widening global gap between rich and poor, and have been pursued in tandem with tougher
immigration restrictions, enhancement of police and security services and defense budgets, and
military interventions in the developing world. Faced with an increasingly precarious and
growing division between rich and poor, capitalist governments in the West face a legitimacy
crisis of stark dimensions. As the late political scientist Peter Mair5 had long observed, and as

others such as Wolfgang Streeck6 have documented extensively, there is an erosion of
democratic accountability in Western capitalist governments that has led to a steady decline of
legitimacy for governing institutions and dominant political parties.
Fueling the legitimacy crisis, transnational corporations have waged a steady ideological
and political war to delegitimize government policies that do not serve corporate or private
interests. Nancy MacLean’s new book, Democracy in Chains, examines the ideological roots of
a radical corporate neoliberal strategy to “deconstruct” government in the U.S. MacLean
profiles the work of economist James Buchanan, whose public choice theory was developed as a
PhD student at the University of Chicago and while he was a Professor of Economics at the
University of Virginia from 1956 through 1968. MacLean argues that Buchanan’s public choice
approach was heavily inspired by the Austrian “neoliberal” or libertarian school of economics
associated with the work of Ludwig von Mises and Friedrich Hayek, among others. Public
choice theory rejects the notion that governments ever pursue programs in the “public interest.”
Instead, Buchanan argues that government bureaucracies and special interests reap “profits” or
“rents” from government programs. In this view, politicians and government bureaucrats are not
public servants, but instead rational actors pursuing their own individual interests by expanding
government programs to benefit themselves and a few well-positioned clientele or special
interests. Buchanan critiques majoritarian democracy as creating the conditions for a permanent
expansion of government bureaucracy, which is fueled by the proliferation of special interests
masquerading as the public.
The end result, according to MacLean, is a view of government as existing largely in
competition with rational actors in the private sector who seek to maximize their return on their
money, investments and talents. The difference between government employees and private
sector entrepreneurs, in this perspective, is that the private sector creates the societal wealth that
the government taxes and distributes as “rent” to special interests which live off the wealth
creation of others. According to MacLean, Buchanan’s theory operates in tandem with a
libertarian orientation that sees the expansion of government as a threat to the private market
economy and to those that drive wealth creation under capitalism: entrepreneurs themselves.
Buchanan’s work provided ideological fodder for those fighting against a more activist
government, including those in Virginia who opposed the Supreme Court decision Brown vs.
Board of Education in 1954, which held that segregated schools were unlawful. Buchanan
become deeply engaged in supporting (a failed) privatization of the Virginia school system as a
political response to Brown vs. Board of Education, a stance which provides a sharp illustration
of his own preference for the private sector over “government interference” in the market,
whether on racial grounds or any other grounds.
MacLean persuasively connects the legacy of James Buchanan to a much more robust
and powerful libertarian movement of think-tanks, corporate elites and politicians who have
railed against government expansion as the foremost problem confronting contemporary
societies. For example, the movement known as “neoliberalism”, although not exactly the same
as libertarianism, has its roots in libertarian ideology, linking back to Buchanan and his
antecedents in the school of Austrian economics and the University of Chicago. During the last
phase of his career, Buchanan was employed at George Mason University, alongside his
longstanding Center for the Study of Public Choice, whose position papers and scholarship
would be closely connected with the emergence of corporate neoliberalism during the 1980s.
The environment of the 1980s proved to be more hospitable to Buchanan’s ideas than was the
case in previous decades. Corporations provided funding for a wide range of right-wing and

libertarian think-tanks and lobbying organizations during the 1970s and 1980s, contributing to an
environment that was very conducive for the spread of radical libertarian ideas.
If there is a flaw in MacLean’s book, it is a far too narrow focus on particular ideologues
associated with the libertarian movement. What goes largely unexplored are the structural
reasons that help explain the expansion of corporate lobbying efforts during the 1970s and
1980s. The context in which Buchanan’s ideas could move from the fringes of U.S. society to
the center of policy debates in contemporary U.S. politics deserves more acknowledgment,
especially given the large body of scholarly literature that critically examines the expansion of
corporate power. While MacLean writes a book largely focused on individuals, the recent book
by Gordon Lafer examines the broader structures of corporate power by locating recent policy
changes within the arena of corporate lobbying networks. Lafer provides compelling evidence
that the global capitalist crisis of 2008 provided an opportunity for well-funded corporate lobbies
to dominate the policy-making agenda at the state level in the U.S. Lobbying organizations led
by the American Legislative Exchange Council, the Chamber of Commerce, the National
Federation of Independent Business, National Association of Manufacturers, and Americans for
Prosperity have advanced a radical right-wing corporate program through lobbying efforts at the
state level. The sum total of their work has included corporate financing to help create
gerrymandered districts that would increase the proportion of right-wing state legislators and
right-wing Congressional representatives sympathetic to “deconstructing the state,” and in the
process make state policy captive to well-organized business interests. Corporate lobbies have
been at the forefront in advancing and writing legislative policy at the state level that has reduced
taxes on corporations and the wealthy, reduced the scope and scale of business regulations,
weakened public sector unions, reduced pensions for public sector workers, and made it much
harder for private sector workers to unionize.
The ability of corporate lobbies to translate the one-time fringe ideas of the libertarian
right-wing into active public policy is a product of both the structure of capitalism and the
agency of individual capitalists and capitalist lobbying networks and think-tanks. The Roberts,
Harris and Robinson books provide us with a big picture analysis that allows us to see the extent
to which the crisis of global capitalism has led to capitalist reorganization of power within the
state and within the market. The more specific case studies of Nancy MacLean and Gordon
Lafer analyze the history and contemporary impact of radical corporate ideology on
policymaking in the U.S. All are important contributions to the knowledge of citizen-activists
who will need to be well-positioned to counter corporate power and their well-paid ideologues in
global capitalist system.
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